Lugar: Sala de Reuniones del Departamento de Economía nº 2026 (2ª planta del Edificio Los Madroños).

Ponente: Antonio Miralles (Università degli Studi di Messina)

Título: Bribing dynamics and resentment (Antonio Miralles, Maurizio Lisciandra y Fabio Monteforte)

Abstract:

We develop a model in which a single briber decides on an optimal schedule of bribing activity to the governing party in a bipartisan system. Detected corruption increases voters' resentment, while periods without corruption reduce resentment. Resentment increases the risk of political overturn when a corruption case is uncovered, and this raises the minimum acceptable bribe. If the briber finds bribing unprofitable for sufficiently high resentment, dynamics tend to a steady resentment state in finite time. The intensity of anger accumulation, when corruption is uncovered, does not affect long-run resentment. A higher exogenous hazard rate of turnover increases long-run corruption-driven resentment. If the briber finds bribing profitable at any resentment level, and initial resentment is high enough, dynamics may show an unbounded growth of resentment, leading to fragile, unstable governments unable to implement any policies.