Course code: 710411 | Subject title: Human Resources | ||||
Credits: 3 | Type of subject: | Year: NULL_VALUE | Period: 2º S | ||
Department: Gestión de Empresas | |||||
Lecturers: | |||||
BARRENECHEA MENDEZ, MARCO ANTONIO (Resp) [Mentoring ] |
Behavior, Contracts, Organizations and Human Resources.
https://ddd.uab.cat/pub/procur/2023-24/g41982a2023-24iSPA.pdf
The process of hiring: setting hiring standards and recruitment tools.
Compensation: fixed salary, benefits, and individual incentives.
Teams: advantages, disadvantages, and composition.
Promotions: sorting vs. incentives.
GP1 Analyse business cases from a theoretical perspective with the aim of better understanding organizational behaviors.
GP2 Develop a critical and a constructive attitude to one's work and that of others.
GP3 Develop an ethical, social and environmental commitment.
GP4 Explain and motivate the analyses, interpret the results and present all these clearly and concisely in English.
GP5 Present research results to various audiences using the different media available.
GP6 Work in multidisciplinary international teams.
SP1 Analyse the different practices and strategies in human resources from the perspective of economic rationality.
SP2 Interpret the most recent theoretical debates about forms of contracting, management and administration of organisations.
1 Analyse the different practices and strategies in human resources from an economic perspective.
2 Design optimal human resource policies.
3 Develop am ethical, social and environmental commitment.
4 Interpret organizational decisions by applying criteria of business efficiency and equity.
5 Investigate the design and organizational culture of the business.
6 Know efficient practices in human resources.
7 Present research to various audiences using the different media available.
8 Recognize the difference between the different theories.
9 Understand the concept of social equity and its complexity in the business environment.
10 Work in multidisciplinary international teams.
Activity | Hours | ECTS |
1- Lectures, discussions and case presentations | 40 | 1,6 |
2- Training and monitoring of work in progress and cases | 10 | 0,4 |
3- Reading related cases and articles and practical preparation | 25 | 1 |
Learning outcome |
Assessment activity |
Weight (%) | It allows test resit |
Minimum required grade |
---|---|---|---|---|
1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 | Exam | 40% | Yes | No |
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 | Individual work | 30% | Yes | No |
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 | Team work | 30% | No | No |
Module I: Hiring.
1. Setting hiring standards: the cost-effectiveness analysis.
2. Recruitment tools.
2.1. High salary.
2.2. Credentials.
2.3. Learning a worker¿s productivity.
2.4. Pay for performance.
2.5. Probation period.
Module II: Compensation.
3. Fixed salary.
4. Benefits.
5. Individual incentives.
5.1. The Principal-Agent Model: Introduction.
5.2. Performance Evaluation.
5.3. Intensity of incentives.
5.4. Safelite Auto Glass.
Module III: Job design
6. Teams
6.1. Advantages
6.2. Disadvantages: free-riding problem
6.3. Size and peer monitoring and norms
6.4. Composition
6.5. Whole Food Market.
7. Promotions
7.1. Dual roles
7.7. Promotion rules
7.8. Incentives
7.9. Evidence
Access the bibliography that your professor has requested from the Library.
Access the bibliography that your professor has requested from the Library.
Basic
Baron, J.N. & Kreps, D.M. (1999): Strategic Human Resources. Frameworks for General Managers, John Wiley & Sons.
Lazear, E.P., Gibbs, M. ¿Personnel Economics in Practice, Wiley, 2015
Gomez-Mejía, L., D. Balkin; R. Cardy, Managing Human Resources, Pearson, 2010 (2012, 2015). Chapter 10. Managing Compensation.
Complementary
Akerlof, G. A. (1978). The market for ¿lemons¿: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. In Uncertainty in economics (pp. 235-251). Academic Press.
Bandiera, O., Prat, A., Hansen, S., & Sadun, R. (2020). CEO behavior and firm performance. Journal of Political Economy, 128(4), 1325-1369.
Bloom, N., Eifert, B., Mahajan, A., McKenzie, D., & Roberts, J. (2013). Does management matter? Evidence from India. The Quarterly journal of economics, 128(1), 1-51.
Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2009). Social connections and incentives in the workplace: Evidence from personnel data. Econometrica, 77(4), 1047-1094.
Jiang, K., Lepak, D.P., Hu, J. & Baer, J.C. (2012). How Does Human Resource Management Influence Organizational Outcomes? A Meta-Analytic Investigation of Mediating Mechanisms, Academy of Management Journal, 55(6), 1264-1294.
Lazear, E. P. (2000). Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Review, 90(5), 1346-1361.
Luo, B.N., Sun, T., Lin, C.H., Luo, D., Qin, G. & Pan, J. (2021). The human resource architecture model: A twenty-year review and future research directions, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 32(2), 241-278.
Mas, A., & Moretti, E. (2009). Peers at work. American Economic Review, 99(1), 112-45.
Meuer, J. (2016). Exploring the complementarities within high-performance work systems: a set-theoretic analysis of UK firms, Human Resource Management, 56(4), pp. 651-672.
Rabl, T., Jayasinghe, M., Gerhart, B. & KUhlmann, T.M. (2014). A meta-analysis of country differences in the high-performance work system-business performance relationship. The roles of national culture and managerial discretion, Journal of Applied Psychology, 99(6), 1011-1041.
Shearer, B. (2004). Piece rates, fixed wages, and incentives: Evidence from a field experiment. The Review of Economic Studies, 71(2), 513-534.
Spence, M. (1978). Job market signaling. In Uncertainty in economics (pp. 281-306). Academic Press.
Wang, Y., Kin, S., Rafferty, A. & Sanders, K. (2020). Employee perceptions of HR practices: A critical review and future directions, International Journal of Human Resource Management, 31(1), 128-173.